Introduction
Previous research on crime by criminologists, sociologists, and economists has found it hard to estimate the distribution of the burden of a given increase in crime across the different groups in society. One important difficulty is that crime-avoiding activities, such as protection and mimicking of low-victimization types, may differ across groups (particularly across different income groups) or may change over time (see, for example, Cook [1986] ; Clarke [1983] ; and Bushway and Reuter [2008] ). As Levitt (1999) explains:
". . . the natural tendency is to calculate the extra burden borne by the poor as a result of higher crime victimization. Such a calculation, however, would ignore the fact that individuals distort their behavior in costly ways (for example, by moving to the suburbs, investing in security systems, or not going out after dark). Any measure of the burden of crime should incorporate not only the costs of those victimized, but also the investment made to avoid victimization. For example, if crime avoidance is a positive function of income (Cullen and Levitt (1999) ), then ignoring costs of avoidance will understate the true crime-related burden felt by the rich. (Levitt 1999, 88) .
Thus, a lower victimization rate in one group may not refl ect a lower burden of crime, but rather a higher investment in crime avoidance. Moreover, protection activities by one group can displace crime onto another group. Data on protection, and other crime-avoiding activities required for a proper calculation, however, are not part of the official statistics collected by the police and are rare in victimization surveys and empirical studies (see, for example, Ehrlich [1996] , who makes this point explicitly). Another serious difficulty is that only a small fraction of the population is usually victimized, and sharp changes in victimization rates are unusual, making it hard to design tests with sufficient statistical power to detect differential changes across income groups. This is evident, for example, in Levitt (1999) , who uses data for the United States.
We study the question of how an increase in crime is distributed across income groups using a crime survey in Argentina where people were asked about their victimization experience, crime-avoiding activities, and income levels. The focus on Argentina is potentially helpful as the country experienced a sharp increase in crime rates during the 1990s (especially during the 2001 crisis), giving salience to the problem of crime. Official statistics, for example, show that the main categories of crime more than doubled (at least) in Buenos Aires during the 1990s, in spite of a reduction in crime-reporting rates. In a relatively short period of time, the main cities of the country experienced striking increases in crime, making crime either the main or one of the main concerns of the population, according to opinion polls. Abundant anecdotal evidence suggests that this crime wave was accompanied by a signifi cant growth in private security protection and other crime-avoiding strategies.
Our results confi rm that there was a large, statistically signifi cant increase in crime over the period of analysis. The total victimization rate, which stands for having been a victim of a crime at home or in the street, went up approximately 24 percentage points. We then use this victimization survey to obtain several estimates of interest. First, signifi cant differences are observed across income groups. The poor (i.e., those below our estimate of the median income in the sample) experience an increase in the total victimization rate of 28 percentage points, while the rich (i.e., those above the sample median) experience an increase of 19 percentage points. In other words, the poor have experienced increases in victimization rates that are almost 1.5 times larger than those experienced by high-income people.
We then study whether this could be explained by differential crime avoidance by the rich. One piece of indirect evidence is obtained by studying victimization categories where the cost of changes in behavior (i.e., adaptation) differs. For example, changing behavior to avoid street robbery (for example, by avoiding dark places or by mimicking less attractive targets) costs less money than changing behavior to avoid home robbery (for example, 1. The use of personal bodyguards on the street is exceptional. by hiring private security). 1 An important fi nding is that robberies in the street, where the rich cannot do better than mimic the behavior of the poor, show similar increases in victimization for both income groups. For home robberies, where the rich can protect themselves with expensive protection devices, we fi nd larger increases in victimization rates among the poor. The size of this differential impact is large. In the early 1990s, rich individuals reported victimization rates that are more than double those reported by the poor. But by 2001, high-income respondents reported victimization rates at home that are smaller (in fact, they are only 75 percent of those reported by the poor).
A third fi nding of the chapter concerns direct evidence on crime-avoidance activities by high-and low-income groups. For mimicking strategies, we consider avoiding the use of jewelry and avoiding dangerous places. For protection strategies, we consider the use of alarm and the hiring of private security. We cannot reject the hypothesis of broadly similar changes in mimicking across high-and low-income groups, but we estimate a signifi cantly larger increase in protection activities by the rich.
Fourth, we then estimate the correlation between victim-adaptation measures and crime victimization in panel regressions. We fi nd a negative correlation between individual private protection measures and home crime victimization rates, controlling for individual and period fi xed effects as well as neighborhood specifi c-period effects. We also offer some tentative arguments that can be used in a causal interpretation.
Finally, the chapter concludes with a short section illustrating one possible use of these estimates to construct an indicator of the burden of crime across income groups. We observe, for example, that street crime allows for mimicking and other low-cost forms of victim adaptation, and that street crime has evolved similarly for rich and poor. Thus, it appears safe to assume that the burden of street crime is similar for both groups under the assumption of negligible mimicking costs. For home robbery, the data paint a different picture. Consider a given increase in victimization at home. On the one hand, high-and low-income groups protect themselves at different rates. Interpreting our estimates of protection on home robbery as causal, we note that the rich are predicted to have avoided almost all of the crime increase (indeed, the difference between the predicted victimization rate and zero is not signifi cant). We note that this is consistent with the observed dynamics of home victimization for the rich (which exhibits no detectable change). On the other hand, and again under a causal interpretation of our estimates, the poor are predicted to have avoided a small part of the increase in crime. We note that this is inconsistent with the observed dynamics of home victimization for the poor, which shows a large increase: the predicted rate of 2. To give just one example: Cook (1986) focuses on how adaptation by potential victims can explain the difference between the emotional cost of crime (of which one measure is fear and appears to be higher for women than for men) and actual victimization experience (which is higher for men). See also the discussion on page 20 of Bushway and Reuter (2008) .
3. A broader comparison across countries, with somewhat different results, is presented in van Kesteren, Mayhew, and Nieuwbeerta (2000) . Note that there is certainly also work aimed at understanding how income distribution (or unemployment rates) are related to crime levels.
4. For reviews of the literature see Land, McCall, and Cohen (1990) ; Patterson (1991) ; inter alia. While empirical work on the issue of private protection is rare, theoretical work includes Shavell (1991); de Meza and Gould (1992) ; and Koo and Png (1994) . See also Becker (1965 Becker ( , 1968 ; Ehrlich (1973) ; Witte (1980); Freeman (1996) ; Tauchen, Witte, and Griesinger (1994) ; Papps and Winkelman (2000) ; Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2000, 2002) ; Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2004); Mocan, Billups, and Overland (2005) ; inter alia. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) discuss the high crime rates in cities, while Londono, Gaviria, and Guerrero (2000) discuss property crime relative to violent crime in Latin America. home robbery for the poor is less than half of what is actually observed. We conjecture that this is the result of a negative externality on the poor, arising from the home protection of the rich.
Although several topics studied in criminology are closely connected to our chapter, previous empirical work on the precise question that we focus on is not large. 2 Some well-known work in criminology has found that victimization rates are higher among high-income groups (see, for example, Shaw and McKay [1942] ; Pantazis [2000] ; Nilsson and Estrada [2003] ; inter alia). 3 It is hard, however, to translate the results of these papers into the differential burden across income groups from a given increase in crime without more information on the adaptation activities of potential victims. 4 A study by Levitt (1999) uses data on crime rates across Chicago neighborhoods as well as data from the U.S. National Crime Victimization Survey over the period 1970 to 1990 to focus on a similar set of issues. He fi nds that property crime in the United States became more concentrated among the poor during this period by approximately 60 percent. Closer to our purposes is Gaviria and Pages (2002) , who study victimization rates for seventeen countries in Latin America between 1996 and 1998, presenting a simple model where potential victims have the possibility of protecting themselves. They show that crime in Latin America tends to affect mostly rich and middle class households living in larger cities. There is relatively less empirical work on victim adaptation by economists, although work by Lott (1998) and Lott and Mustard (1997) has explored the possibility that potential victims protect themselves through concealed handguns, while Cullen and Levitt (1999) study urban fl ight as a response to high rates of city crime. A related issue is that criminals may respond to victim adaptation; for example, by switching to other areas or other crimes. Hessling (1994) reviews the literature on crime displacement (see also Cornish and Clarke [1987] ). Levitt (1999) explains several limitations of previous work, including those emerging from the lack of information on crime avoidance activities.
Section 5.2 briefl y describes the theory that illustrates the effect of increases 5. The assumption of fully effective protection seems strong, but we note that private security booths are patently observable, while the main companies installing alarm systems also place a sticker on the main entrance with the legend "this house is fi tted with an alarm system by company xx." This is in contrast to the car protection system (Lo Jack) studied in Ayres and Levitt (1998) .
6. Note that if the security system cost c is too high nobody hires private security, as it may happen for street protection. Also note that we allow thieves to become victims themselves, but we assume they do not hire private security. in victimization across income groups when victims can adapt. Section 5.3 describes our data and empirical strategy. Section 5.4 presents our basic set of results, while section 5.5 concludes.
A Theoretical Illustration of Crime with Victim-Adaptation
When crime increases, high-income citizens can protect themselves through the acquisition of expensive alarms or the hiring of private security devices. If this occurs, it is possible that low-income households suffer the main increase in victimization. We illustrate these ideas using a simple and stylized one-shot game.
Start by assuming a continuum of agents with indexed ability x i spread over the closed interval [0, 1] with distribution function G(.), assumed to be continuous over the domain of x and strictly concave. One simple way to derive equilibrium crime is to assume that a friction exists in the labor market, so that wages below f cannot be paid legally. This means the fraction G( f ) of individuals become criminals to avoid starvation.
Noncriminals earn w i ϭ x i and have to decide whether to set up an (observable) security system at cost c, or do nothing in this regard. For simplicity, we assume that the security system is fully effective and that wealth is not observable, so that criminals distribute randomly among unprotected agents. 5 Then, people set up a security system if
where p the probability of victimization is equal to
and where the cut-off w * is defi ned as
where agents with w i Ն w * hire security systems. 6 Note that when the predisposition for crime increases-for example, because the friction f becomes larger-the consumption of security systems increases (agents with lower w i now protect themselves). And because protection is a normal good (and assumed to be effective), increases in crime lead 7. Gaviria and Pages (2002) present a related model of crime protection, but without displacement. Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2004) analyze a general equilibrium model of appropriation, which predicts a positive association between crime and inequality that can naturally be applied to study the changes during a period of economic reforms such as those that occurred in Argentina during the 1990s. the distribution of crime to become concentrated on lower income groups. Indeed, the probability of victimization for the unprotected increases on two accounts. First, the total number of criminals increases. And second, the number of unprotected targets is lower as more citizens hire private security. The concentration of crime increases on the group of poor individuals is all a consequence of crime displacement taking place due to higher investment in protection. In summary, the model yields the following predictions:
• The use of private security devices increases with the number of criminals. • The use of private security devices concentrates on rich households. • The poor suffer the main burden of crime increases.
The predictions of this simple model can be compared to our data on the evolution of crime in Argentina during the 1990s. At a relatively low unemployment rate, crime was low. As unemployment rates soared in the mid-1990s, the rich increasingly paid the costs of hiring private protection. This behavioral response allowed the rich to avoid victimization, so that subsequent increases in unemployment continued raising the crime levels experienced by the poor. Crime rises as a result of the increase in the number of criminals (due to, say, higher unemployment), but it concentrates disproportionally in poor neighborhoods as high-income neighborhoods hire private security devices (which constitutes a negative externality on the poor). 7
Data and Empirical Strategy

Design and Data Description
Design A household victimization survey is the main source of information for this study. 8 The target population of the study was the population of the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area. The questionnaire was performed in 2002 to 200 households in the city of Buenos Aires and 200 households in the suburban Great Buenos Aires through telephone interviews. In addition, 100 street interviews were performed to people that declared not to have a home telephone line. The survey collected information on victimization events, crime reporting, behavioral responses to crime, consumption of private protection, possession of durable goods and assets, and demographic household information. Note that official crime statistics do not typically collect such data, so that their inadequacy (for the purposes of this chapter) goes beyond the usual difficulties arising from victim underreporting or political manipulation.
Although the survey was cross-sectional, it asked households to report retrospective information for the entire decade (1990 to 2001). However, retrospective information is sometimes subject to recall bias. Thus, the survey was designed exploiting several techniques specially developed to minimize this nuisance. First, the information set was restricted to major crime events: armed robberies and forcible entry into homes. The restriction to major events signifi cantly reduces typical recall bias of retrospection, which is mainly associated to "microscopic" events (Aday 1996; Reuband 1994) . Moreover, we concentrate on whether the household has been the victim of a crime during a period of time, but not on the number of times this has occurred. We should expect that recall bias has a larger effect on the latter than on the former. Additionally, the retrospective information was asked sacrifi cing precision about the exact year of occurrence of an event, but gaining confi dence by considering longer time periods. Thus, the survey considered three periods: 1990 to 1994 (the fi rst part of the decade with one-digit unemployment rates and strong growth); 1995 to 2000 (the period after the Tequila Crisis, with the unemployment rate around 15 percent-after a peak of 18.3 percent-and a declining economy after 1998); and the fi nal year of 2001 (with an unemployment rate of 18 percent that then reached 21.5 percent in early 2002, together with the default of the external debt, a large devaluation, and political instability). Moreover, the survey used bounded recall procedures to reduce underreporting of crime events that took place in previous periods (see, among others, Aday [1996] ; Sudman, Finn, and Lannon 1984) . More importantly, our main question is which group has been mostly affected by the increase in crime levels. As this question refers to the relative changes in victimization rates rather than the levels, the results will not be affected by recall bias if this bias affects both groups (rich and poor) similarly (this is the root identifi cation assumption of our chapter).
A fi nal data issue is that the measure of income levels is a delicate matter because some people decline to reveal their income in a survey. Income questions could be particularly sensitive in a survey about private security. Instead of asking directly about income, the survey addressed this problem by asking questions on education level, ocupation, and availability of cars, appliances (personal computer, air conditioner, and automatic washing machine), and credit cards, in order to infer income levels from these variables. The opinion poll company, following the methodology developed by the Argentine Marketing Association (1998), provided us with an index of income level that collapses all the indicators of household education, ocupa-9. These crime and reporting rates are consistent with other victimization surveys performed in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area. For example, a survey performed by the Justice Ministry reports that 41 percent of the respondents declared to have suffered a crime during 1999, but only 29 percent of those crimes were reported to the police (Ministerio de Justicia 2000). 10 . Soares (2004) shows that the positive links between crime and development arise because of increases in crime reporting. tion, and wealth into a continuous variable. Appendix A shows the details of this methodology. We defi ne a household as rich if its income index is equal or above the median in our sample (which would approximately correspond to the urban middle class), and poor otherwise.
Data
Our research strategy is based on exploiting the salience of crime in Buenos Aires after the sharp increases in crime during the second half of the 1990s and in particular during the year 2001. Table 5 .1 shows that 10.2 percent of the households interviewed by the survey suffered a home robbery (forcible entry into their house) during 2001. This percentage was the same for the whole period 1995 to 2000, and 7.9 percent for 1990 to 1994. Only 43.1 percent of these crimes were reported to the police in 2001, but the fi gure was larger in the previous years (45.1 percent for 1995 to 2000, and 74.4 percent for 1990 to 1994). For robberies outside the home, 34.6 percent of the individuals in our sample declare that at least one member of the household has been robbed during 2001. This percentage was 27.5 percent for 1995 to 2000, and 10.0 percent for 1990 to 1994, suggesting that there was a significant increase in victimization rates (note that the question refers to periods of different length). The reporting rate of this type of crime tends to be lower than for home robberies, but it is also decreasing (36.8 percent for 2001, 46.7 percent for 1995 to 2000, and 51.1 percent for 1990 to 1994). 9 These reporting rates confi rm that, because of victims' tendency to underreport, official fi gures underestimate crime levels. 10 Indeed, this problem worsens during crime waves, because crime reporting falls as crime increases. Moreover, the rich are signifi cantly more likely to report crimes at home than the poor, although there were no signifi cant differences in the reporting of street crimes across income groups.
Consistent with this evidence of sharp crime increases, table 5A.6 in appendix B shows a growing feeling of insecurity in the population. The exact question asks, "In your neighborhood, would you say that insecurity with respect to one decade ago has increased a lot, some, a little, has not changed at all, or has decreased?" The answers show that 68.8 percent of individuals think that insecurity increased some or a lot over the previous decade. Less than 1 percent of respondents fi nd that insecurity decreased. Our research strategy requires changes in crime of the magnitude observed in Argentina between 1990 and 2001 for two reasons. First, it gives us some confi dence that crime has "salience" as an issue to individual respondents so that the information produced through the administration of surveys has reasonable accuracy and reliability. Second, it is statistically possible to detect differences across groups (in this case following income lines) without extremely large samples.
Finally, to provide some evidence on the potential presence of recall bias affecting our results, we exploit two extra survey questions. The survey asked at the beginning the number of times a member of the household had been robbed on the street during the period 1990 to 1994. At the very end of the questionnaire, the survey then asked again the number of times a member of the household had been robbed on the street during 1990 to 1992, and during 1993 to 1994, something that allows us to control for the consistency of the responses. There is a high level of consistency among respondents. The correlation between the sum of the responses to these two fi nal questions and the previous response for the whole period is 0.9. Additionally, note that our empirical strategy is based on comparisons across income groups, which will not be affected by recall bias as long as this bias is uncorrelated with income levels. The correlation between our income level index and the difference between the original report of crime and the ex-post report is very low (0.02).
Empirical Strategy
In this chapter we test several propositions regarding the relationship between victimization and income. We fi rst study differences in the change in crime rates across income groups. Specifi cally we test:
(1) ⌬Crime rich ϭ ⌬Crime poor against the alternative hypothesis of different crime rates for the two groups, and where ⌬Crime group denotes the change in the crime rate for group ϭ rich, poor from 1990 to 2001 considering the three subperiods 1990 to 1994, 1995 to 2000, and 2001 . Given that the periods have differing lengths, the meaning of having the value of 0.1 (which stands for having 10 percent of the respondents victimized) in two different periods means different things. This makes it transparent that we believe that historical victimization rates taken from memory must be taken with care when used to make absolute statements across periods, such as, "the amount of crime has increased" 11. This is analogous to the widely conducted studies in education that exploit panel data of test scores, where the inherent difficulty of the exam changes from year to year. These analyses also assume that this potential problem is controlled by the inclusion of year fi xed-effects in the regression equations. See Lavy (2002) ; Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2008) ; inter alia.
(although it can partially be done). Instead, we are confi dent in making statements about differences across groups in a given period, where victimization rates are strictly comparable, and also in conducting difference-indifferences analysis, which exploits the differential change in victimatization between groups, and for which the change in the length of periods, and hence the likelihood of the realization of the event of interest, is affected equally for rich and poor. 11 Another test concerns differences in the way potential victims adapt across the two income groups. A variety of victim strategies are possible. First, victims may actively protect themselves in such a way that it is more costly for criminals to access the bounty and get away with it safely. A typical example is the hiring of a private security guard, but it also includes the use of alarms and locks. A second possibility is that potential victims may change their behavior in order to passively reduce the likelihood of suffering a crime. A typical example is the case of potential victims of crime who avoid certain high-risk activities (walking alone on the street versus walking in groups). Potential victims may also reduce the expected cost of crime by carrying less money or jewels, both because this reduces the cost of any given crime and also because the probability of suffering a crime is lower. In the latter case victim adaptation can take the form of mimicking, whereby members of some group resemble the potential victims of another group with a lower probability of suffering a crime. For example, carrying fewer jewels makes a rich individual (with lots of money in his wallet) resemble a poor individual (with a thin wallet), where the latter are less attractive to criminals.
As a fi rst approach to testing for the existence of victim adaptation, we study different types of crime where some forms of adaptation are not possible. For example, it is extremely hard to use protection to reduce crime on the streets. Although some extremely rich individuals use bodyguards, this is absolutely exceptional in Argentina. The type of adaptation to reduce such crimes is likely to be cheap, such as walking on the part of the street where there is light, so it is likely to be used by both income groups. However, the use of security guards and alarms as protection for crimes at home is feasible, but expensive, and likely to be used more intensively by the rich. In other words, we test (2) ⌬CrimeType rich ϭ ⌬CrimeType poor where ⌬CrimeType group denotes the change in the crime rate of type ϭ street, home and for the group ϭ rich, poor over the relevant time period. The expectation is that the change in street crime becomes similar for both groups when victims adapt. In contrast, since private protection is more likely to be purchased by the rich, we expect the change in home crime to be greater for the poor when victims adapt. We complement this evidence with direct information on activities that denote adaptation:
(3) ⌬Activity rich ϭ ⌬Activity poor ,
where ⌬Activity group denotes the change in the activity for the group ϭ rich, poor over the relevant time period. The expectation is that the change in activities that involve protection at home (security guards and alarms), or a reduction in expected crime costs (avoid carrying jewels or credit cards, and avoid dark and dangerous places) are more intensive for rich individuals. The fi nal empirical exercise of the chapter is to estimate the effect of changes in behavior (⌬Activity group ) on crime victimization (⌬CrimeType group ). Although individual, period, and neighborhood period effects are included, it should be noted that an obvious difficulty in estimating such a relationship is the possibility of reverse causality. Accordingly, we explore some arguments that can be used in a causal interpretation of the estimates we present. More interesting is fi gure 5.2, where total crime is separated by income group using our index for income levels. The rich start the decade with double the victimization rate than the poor (22 percent versus 11 percent, a difference that is signifi cant at the 1 percent level). By the year 2001, the rates had risen to approximately 40 percent and were statistically indistinguishable. Statistical tests are presented in table 5.2.
Empirical Results
Total Victimization Rates (at
The evidence suggests that the poor have been the recipients of most of the increase in crime. The increase in crime for the poor has been approximately 1.5 times that suffered by the rich. The difference-in-differences change of the victimization rates between the fi rst and last period of our study is signifi cant at the 5 percent level. As a comparison note, for the United States, Levitt (1999) fi nds that property crime has become more concentrated on the poor over time. The magnitude of our fi nding is in line with his estimates. He reports that while in the 1970s high-income households were slightly more likely to be burglarized than low-income households, by the 1990s lowincome households were 60 percent more likely to be the victims of crime.
Victimization Rates at Home and in the Street
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 separately present the evolution of two different types of crime, at home or in the street, where victim adaptation is likely to differ by income group. Indeed, some of the possible behavioral responses at home involve costly actions (alarm, etc.) whereas those on the street appear to be cheaper (avoid the use of jewelry). Thus, a different response in the two crime categories would be indirect evidence of victim adaptation. Figure 5 .3 studies the evolution of victimization rates for street robberies across income groups. The difference-in-differences analysis for robberies suffered by household members outside the house is presented in table 5.3. For the three periods, high-income households suffered a higher victimization rate than low-income families. The cross-sectional difference seems signifi cant (at the 10 percent level of statistical signifi cance) for the three periods. Moreover, both groups have suffered a signifi cant increase in crime levels. Difference-in-differences tests, however, are never statistically significant at conventional levels, suggesting that the evolution of victimization rates have not differed across income groups. Figure 5 .4 studies victimization at home, while the accompanying table 5.4 presents the associated tests. For the period 1990 to 1994, high-income households suffered a home victimization rate that was more than double that observed by low-income families (11 percent versus 5 percent). After that period, low-income households suffered a signifi cant increase in victim-ization likelihood, while high-income families show a nonsignifi cant decline. The cross-sectional difference becomes insignifi cant in those subsequent periods. Thus, the victimization rate of the low-income households caught up to the high-income rate during the decade. Importantly, the differencein-differences tests show that the change in the victimization rate of the lowincome group is signifi cantly different from the change for the high-income households. 
Fig. 5.3 Street robbery victimization rates
Adaptation at Home and in the Street
A possible explanation for these differing crime dynamics by income group is that victims adapt. Figures 5.5 through 5.8, with their corresponding tables, present four possible forms of adaptation. The fi rst two involve costly investments in self-protection devices (hiring private security and buying alarms) while the last two involve a change in behavior that reduces the exposure to crime. Figure 5 .5 (and the corresponding table 5.5) focuses on 1990-1994 1995-2000 2001 [2001]-[1990-1994] Diff-in-diff [1995-2000]-[1990-1994] the hiring of private security guards, an industry that grew substantially during the 1990s in Argentina and that affects home robbery. The survey reveals that few households hire private security in the early part of the decade (7 percent of the rich versus 2 percent of the poor). By the year 2001, the hiring of private security had grown 16 percentage points among the rich and 8 percentage points for the poor. The difference in these changes in protection is statistically signifi cant at the 1 percent level. A similar picture of differential adaptation emerges from studying data on installing alarms, a cheaper form of protection at home (see fi gure 5.6 1990-1994 1995-2000 2001 [2001]-[1990-1994] Diff-in-diff [1995-2000]-[1990-1994] 1990-1994 1995-2000 2001 [2001]-[1990-1994] Diff-in-diff [1995-2000]-[1990-1994] Diff-in-diff [2001]-[1995-2000] Diff-in-diff to avoid becoming a victim of a robbery outside their houses. 12 The survey asked on avoiding dark places and avoiding the use of jewels. Figure  5 .7 shows that both income groups have adapted by avoiding dark places as crime rates increased. More than 60 percent of the interviewed people 1990-1994 1995-2000 2001 [2001]-[1990-1994] Diff-in-diff [1995-2000]-[1990-1994] 12. In the sample, 173 households declared that one of its members had been robbed outside the house during 2001. Those robberies took place on the street (125), in a car or public transportation (27), at work (3), in a shop or restaurant (15), at a bank or ATM (2) , and other places (1). declared to avoid dark places by the year 2001. There do not appear to be differences in the adoption of this strategy between poor and rich individuals, as table 5.7 confi rms.
A second measure of adaptation on the street is avoiding using jewels (see fi g. 5.8 and table 5.8). Early in the sample period only 11 percent of the sample declared avoiding the use of jewels, a rate that is similar across income groups (although presumably the stock of jewels is larger among the rich). By the year 2001, 47 percent of the rich and 37 percent of the poor declared to purposely avoid using jewels. The difference for the two groups 1990-1994 1995-2000 2001 [2001]-[1990-1994] Diff-in-diff [1995-2000]-[1990-1994] Diff-in-diff 13. We conducted a series of interviews with key informants, including several officials at the Security Ministry, the chief of the Federal Police during part of the 1990s, a former federal judge, and a former federal prosecutor, among others.
14. An alternative specifi cation following the approach in the literature on technological horizontal spillovers (for a recent example see Smarzynska Javorcik [2004] and the references cited therein) exploits differences in average protection across our seven zones. Accordingly, we added to our baseline model (column [7] of table 5.9) the average level of protection of the rich by zone of residence interacted with a dummy that equals one if the household is classifi ed as rich. The coefficient on the "Aggregate Level of Security Devices at Home" (which is simply the average for the zone) is negative, although only signifi cant at the 10 percent level. The coefficient is signifi cant and, more importantly, the differences across income groups in the change in "Avoid using Jewels" are signifi cant.
An alternative explanation for the differing crime dynamics by income group is that public officials might have biases against the poor in the provision of police services (World Bank 2000) . The evidence, however, is not consistent with this hypothesis. First note that in Argentina, public police provision is not decentralized at the county level. Although the police told us that they purposely avoid cross-sectional differences, 13 it is still possible that political economy considerations (but not those directly based on local tax collection) can lead to more intense public police deterrence in rich neighborhoods. However, note that such political economy aspects would explain the observed crime dynamics only if the differential deployment of police on rich versus poor areas changes over time. The survey explores the presence of differential public police provision, as it included information on police protection by asking at which frequency police walk or drive in front of people's houses. Table 5A .7 in appendix B presents the survey responses on public police protection, which reveal no differences in the treatment and protection that the poor receive from the police relative to the rich.
The Impact of Victim Adaptation on Home Robbery
Our data allows us to estimate correlations between the adoption of protection measures and victimization at home. Table 5 .9 presents the results for having private security and having an alarm. All regressions include household fi xed effects, and two estimates are reported for each protection device, one that controls for period fi xed effects and one that controls for zone of residence-period fi xed effects. In order to conduct this analysis we divide the Buenos Aires metropolitan area into seven zones of residence. The correlation is negative and signifi cant. Both protective devices appear to reduce the likelihood of victimization at home in a given period of time. When entered together in the regression, private security appears to be 20 percent more effective than the use of alarms, but the difference is not significant at conventional levels. The last two columns produce the same results, aggregating the two measures of home protection into an index of security devices at home-that is, the average value of the private security and alarm dummy variables. 14 on "Index of Security Devices at Home" is still negative and signifi cant. Indeed, its size is very similar to that reported in the corresponding regression in table 5.9, column (7).
15. For the causal effect of the introduction of fi xed and observable police protection, a technology that resembles private security protection, see Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) . They also discuss potential crime displacement induced by observable security guards. Ayres and Levitt (1998) show positive externalities from the use of unobservable protection devices.
16. Strictly, this analysis is only correct for home victimization because the measures of adaptation refer to the stock (e.g., whether people use alarms or hire private security), whereas our measures of adaptation on the street refer to changes (e.g., to avoid using jewels, not the absolute amount of jewelry that people use). Such changes are not necessarily related to stocks (those that do not have jewels can only trivially "avoid using jewels"). In an attempt to conduct a similar analysis for street victimization, we regressed street victimization on the changes in avoiding using jewels and avoiding dark places, household fi xed effects and period (or zone of residence-period) fi xed effects. These changes were never statistically signifi cant, neither when entered alone nor when both changes were included together.
Obviously, caution must be exerted when giving these correlations a causal interpretation. 15 However, we note that the obvious sources of confounding effects are controlled for in the models we estimate. One potentially serious issue in relating the adoption of protection measures and victimization is that some people are both more likely to be victimized and also more likely to use security devices irrespective of the causal effect of the latter on the former. This problem, however, does not interfere with our estimates because we are including individual fi xed effects in our models. We also believe that our estimates do not refl ect a tendency for people to protect themselves in the presence of a crime wave because we are including period fi xed effects. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the inclusion of zone of residence-period fi xed effects also controls for the possibility that our estimates are biased downward because of a tendency for people who live in areas where there is a particularly large increase in crime to protect themselves. 16 Table 5.10 presents some further evidence that is relevant to provide our estimates with a causal interpretation, by investigating whether exposure to crime in previous periods predicts the adoption of security devices. The negative and insignifi cant coefficient does not suggest a reverse causality.
One Possible Calculation for the Burden of Crime (Using Home Robbery)
These estimates can be used to approximate the burden of crime suffered by the different groups. Indeed, it is possible to start with the estimated model in column (7) of table 5.9 and note that in this estimated equation the 2001 period fi xed effect is equal to 0.04 (t-value ϭ 2.03). This gives us a measure of the overall increase in home victimization for the period 1990 to 2001 in the absence of any adaptation by victims.
We fi rst focus on the implications for the rich. Given that the increase in the "Index of Security Devices at Home" for the period for the high-income group was in fact 0.154, we can conclude (under a causal interpretation of Table 5 .9 The impact of security devices on home robbery (1) (2) (3) our estimates in table 5.9) that protection helped the rich reduce crime by 0.028 (0.028 ϭ 0.183 * 0.154) and hence avoid 70 percent of the exogenous increase in crime (0.7 ϭ 0.028/0.04). This means that the rich are predicted to have avoided almost all of the crime increase. A formal test of the hypothesis that the reduction in crime as a result of protection is in fact 0.04 is not rejected at conventional levels of statistical signifi cance [F(1, 996) ϭ 1.38]. We note that this is consistent with the observed dynamics of home victimization for the rich: the change in home robbery between 1990 and 2001 for the rich is not statistically signifi cant at conventional levels (see table 5 .4). Thus, the evidence is broadly consistent with the hypothesis that the rich homes avoided the Argentine crime wave by increasing their level of protection. On the other hand, and again under a causal interpretation of our estimates, the poor are predicted to have avoided only a small part of the increase in crime. The increase in the "Index of Security Devices at Home" for the period for the poor was 0.065, so protection helped the poor reduce crime by 0.011 (0.011 ϭ 0.065 * 0.183) and hence avoid 27 percent of the shock in crime (0.27 ϭ 0.011/0.04). We note that the predicted increase of 0.029 (ϭ 0.04 -0.011) is inconsistent with the observed dynamics of home victimization for the poor because "Home Robbery" for the poor increases by 0.07 (see table 5.4). In other words, the predicted rate of home robbery for the poor is less than half of what is actually observed.
We conjecture that this discrepancy is the result of a negative externality arising from home protection by the rich. Indeed, the excess of crime observed for the poor over the predicted rate is 0.041, which is consistent with the rich avoiding all the increase in crime, which gets diverted to the poor (we do not reject the null hypothesis of full displacement at conventional levels of statistical signifi cance [F(1, 966) ϭ 0.2]. Of course, this is just one way to decompose the changes in crime in our sample. But it highlights the main message of our simple model, whereby after a large exogenous increase in crime, the rich protect themselves, avoiding all the effect of crime, while the poor receive more crime than otherwise as a result of the displacement or negative externality generated by the rich. 
Conclusion
An important question in the literature on crime concerns the relative impact among the rich and poor of a given increase in crime. The observed victimization rates for the groups are insufficient to derive the differential welfare burden of crime because individuals change their behavior in costly ways in order to avoid crime (for example, by hiring protection and engaging in mimicking types with lower victimization risk). The extent of such investments to avoid crime is likely to differ across income groups. If the rich have more resources to invest in crime protection, ignoring victim adaptation will obscure the burden of crime suffered by the rich (and the externalities such behavior may impose on the poor). In this chapter we provide several estimates that contribute to evaluate these effects.
We take advantage of a dramatic increase in crime that took place in Argentina during the 1990s using a survey that asked individuals their victimization rates at different points in time and their investment in crime avoidance, both at home and on the street. While our data has some weaknesses (for example, the assumption of similar rates of recollections of victimization episodes across income groups might be questioned), we believe that the importance of the question (which socioeconomic group is most affected by a crime shock) and the paucity of previous results, provide justifi cation for experimenting with a different approach. Moreover, some of the conditions in Argentina during this period (for example, the general salience of crime and the sharp increases in crime rates and in crime-avoiding activities) make it a reasonable place to look for retrospective victimization information. We obtain several fi ndings of interest, including:
1. During the period leading up to the economic crisis of 2001, crime increased more for the poor than for the rich. The increase in the total victimization rate for the poor was 1.5 times the increase in total victimization observed for the rich.
2. Changes in victimization in the street were similar for both income groups. In contrast, the increase in victimization at home was larger for the poor than for the rich. Indeed, whereas in the early part of the decade, victimization at home for the rich was signifi cantly larger than for the poor, in the year 2001 they were similar (if anything it was somewhat larger for the poor). This pattern is suggestive of victim adaptation because the cost of adaptation is lower on the street relative to home.
3. Direct evidence on victim adaptation reveals a different pattern across income groups. The rich are signifi cantly more likely to hire private security and to install alarms than the poor. Adaptation on the street presents a different picture. The rich and the poor report similar increases in the avoidance of dark places. The rich report a larger increase in the avoidance of using jewels (although we expect them to start out with a higher level of jewelry). 4. We report a negative correlation between victimization at home and the use of alarms or private security, even after controlling for household fi xed effects, for period fi xed effects, and for the interaction of zones and period fi xed effects. We also report that previous experience with victimization at home is not correlated with the adoption of security devices. 5. We illustrate one possible use of these measures to estimate how victims' behavior affects the distribution of the crime burden across income group. We observe that street crime has evolved similarly for rich and poor. Given that victim adaptation on the street (e.g., mimicking) is likely to be cheap, it appears safe to assume a similar burden of street crime for both groups. For victimization at home, and under a causal interpretation of our estimates, we note that the rich are predicted to have avoided almost all of the crime increase. This is indeed consistent with the observed dynamics of home victimization for the rich (which exhibits no detectable change). On the other hand, the poor are predicted to have avoided a small part of the increase in crime. This is inconsistent with the observed dynamics of home victimization for the poor, which exhibits a large increase. Indeed, the predicted rate of home robbery for the poor is less than half of what is actually observed, which is consistent with crime displacement from the rich to the poor. Given the lack of regulation of private protection activities in most of the world, our results highlight the need for the better design of public security policies of further investigating the extent to which victim adaptation induces negative externalities across groups.
Wealth.
(a) Goods and services. It measures the household capacity of accumulation of goods and services. The points are assigned according to table 5A.4. (b) Automobile: the questions asked are concerned with (a) the number of automobiles owned; (b) the branch, model, and age of the fi rst automobile, if applies; and (c) the branch, model, and age of the second automobile, if applies. Using this information, points are assigned separately for each car according to table 5A.5.
Finally, the automobile point assignment must satisfy the following two rules: (1) if the fi nal number of points is between 1 and 3, then zero is assigned to this category; and (2) if the sum of the points assigned for both cars together reaches 15 points or more, then 14 is assigned to this category. Note: Two-thirds of the points of his or her last occupation are assigned to unemployed, retired, or pensioner household heads. .75 Between 6 and 9 years 3.5 6 6.5 Between 3 and 5 years 5.5 7 8.5 Less than 2 years 6.5 8 9.5 Appendix B 
